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Abstract
According to the Fisher hypothesis, the gap between Canadian nominal and Real Return Bond
yields (or break-even inﬂation rate) should be a good measure of inﬂation expectations. The
authors ﬁnd that this measure was higher, on average, and more variable than survey measures of
inﬂation expectations between 1992 and 2003. They examine whether risk premiums and
distortions embedded in this interest rate gap can account for these facts. Their results indicate
that distortions were likely an important reason for the high level and variation of this measure
over much of the 1990s. There is little evidence that the distortions examined were as important
between 2000 and 2003, but the high level of the break-even inﬂation rate in 2004 may be
evidence of their return. Given the potential distortions, and the difﬁculty in identifying them, the
authors conclude that it is premature to consider this measure a reliable gauge of monetary policy
credibility. In addition, it is not as useful as competing tools for short- and medium-term inﬂation
forecasting.
JEL classiﬁcation: E31, E43
Bank classiﬁcation: Interest rates; Inﬂation and prices; Market structure and pricing
Résumé
Selon l’hypothèse de Fisher, l’écart de rendement entre les obligations canadiennes à rendement
nominal et à rendement réel (ou taux d’inﬂation neutre) devrait être un bon indicateur des attentes
d’inﬂation. Les auteurs constatent qu’entre 1992 et 2003, cet écart a été supérieur, en moyenne,
aux mesures de l’inﬂation attendue établies par enquête, et plus variable également. Ils cherchent
à savoir si les primes de risque et les distorsions comprises dans l’écart de rendement y sont pour
quelque chose. D’après leurs résultats, les distorsions expliquent probablement en bonne partie le
niveau élevé et les variations de l’écart de rendement durant la majeure partie des années 1990.
Rien ne porte à croire qu’elles aient été aussi importantes entre 2000 et 2003, mais le niveau élevé
du taux d’inﬂation neutre en 2004 pourrait être le signe de leur résurgence. Étant donné les
distorsions possibles et la difﬁculté de les prendre en compte, les auteurs concluent qu’il est
prématuré de considérer cette mesure comme un baromètre ﬁable de la crédibilité de la politique
monétaire. En outre, le taux d’inﬂation neutre n’est pas aussi utile que les autres outils existants
pour la prévision de l’inﬂation à court et à moyen terme.
Classiﬁcation JEL : E31, E43
Classiﬁcation de la Banque : Taux d’intérêt; Inﬂation et prix; Structure de marché et ﬁxation des
prix     
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1.  Introduction 
According to the Fisher hypothesis, the spread between nominal and real interest rates 
should provide a good measure of inflation expectations. Real interest rates can be 
derived from the price of Real Return Bonds (RRBs) (inflation-indexed bonds issued by 
the Government of Canada), because they compensate the investor for realized inflation, 
guaranteeing the real value of coupon payments and principal. Nominal interest rates 
from conventional bonds compensate the investor for the future inflation rate expected at 
the time of sale. The spread between nominal and real interest rates is commonly referred 
to as the break-even inflation rate (BEIR), because it is the inflation rate that equates 
returns across the two types of bond. Since Canada issues only RRBs that have a 30-year 
maturity, the BEIR is constructed from yields on long-term bonds and (in the absence of 
distortions) indicates the expected average inflation rate over a 25- to 30-year horizon 
that is priced into the market. 
To determine whether the BEIR is a good measure, we examine the historical experience 
for conformance with our priors about the behaviour of long-run inflation expectations. 
The broad trends do conform, but the BEIR is volatile and at times shows persistent 
movements in the opposite direction from other measures of inflation expectations. This 
paper examines whether these movements can be attributed to changes in risk premiums 
and other distortions that affect the BEIR, rather than changes in inflation expectations. 
It is useful for the conduct of monetary policy to have a good measure of inflation 
expectations. The worth of the BEIR in this capacity depends on how it is to be used and 
over what horizon. Based on the experience to the end of 2003, we argue that the BEIR 
shows promise as a measure of agents’ views about the long-run credibility of a central 
bank’s commitment to keep inflation near its target. Nonetheless, events in 2004 suggest 
that premiums and distortions may recur. Due to the difficulty in identifying and 
quantifying these distortions, one should not place much weight on the BEIR as a 
measure of credibility at this time. In addition, the Canadian BEIR is a less reliable tool 
than competing methods used to obtain short-term inflation forecasts.        
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2.  Methodology and Previous Findings 
We consider the usefulness of the BEIR from two perspectives: as a measure of monetary 
policy credibility and as an aid to inflation forecasting. Monetary policy is credible when 
agents expect that future inflation will be near the inflation target. If the BEIR captures 
inflation expectations accurately, its position relative to the target should be a good 
measure of credibility. Since the true expected inflation rate is unobservable, we must 
find indirect ways to assess the accuracy of the BEIR. In this paper, we assess whether 
the BEIR’s behaviour over its 12-year history fits with what we think we know about 
inflation expectations. Survey data serve as the primary basis for comparison. We find 
that the BEIR and survey measures of inflation expectations are sometimes at odds over 
our sample; we therefore evaluate the ability of premiums and distortions in the BEIR to 
explain these divergences. The BEIR may also be useful if it improves our ability to 
forecast inflation. We assess the forecast performance of the BEIR relative to survey 
measures of expectations and other simple models.  
Many of the studies in the literature rely on the use of survey measures of inflation 
expectations as the benchmark for comparison, and we continue this practice. 
Nonetheless, consensus survey measures have been criticized for a number of reasons. 
Survey respondents are weighted equally, regardless of their convictions or ability to 
forecast inflation well. They may also have little incentive to reveal private information.
1 
In principle, market-based measures do not have these shortcomings. They are 
determined by actions, which are more revealing than opinions. The convictions of 
market players are “weighted by their ‘dollar votes,’ which reflect the confidence and 
stake people have in their predictions” (Haubrich and Dombrosky 1992). Market 
participants who have good information can profit at the expense of those who are 
irrational or who have poor information. In addition, market-based measures are available 
at a much higher frequency than survey data, and they therefore should provide more 
current information about expectations.  
                                                 
1.   Professional forecasters may behave strategically, providing forecasts that are close to 
consensus—rather than reflecting their true forecast—to avoid being the only one who was 
wrong. Conversely, they may make contrarian forecasts to attract more attention to their 
products.      
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We use survey measures of inflation expectations as a benchmark for comparison 
because true expectations are unobservable and survey measures are the main alternative 
source of information. They are not subject to inflation uncertainty, liquidity risk, and the 
other distortions that are potential sources of bias in the BEIR. Nonetheless, differences 
between survey measures and the BEIR may be due to biases in the survey measures, in 
addition to those in the BEIR. An exploration of the size and nature of survey biases, 
however, is beyond the scope of this paper. 
2.1  Previous research 
In countries that issue inflation-linked debt, the BEIR has often given a different signal 
than surveys of inflation expectations. The U.S. BEIR is, on average, lower than long-run 
inflation expectations obtained from surveys, and it is much more volatile. In addition, 
changes in the BEIR do not coincide with changes in survey measures. In contrast to the 
United States, long-term BEIRs in the United Kingdom are higher, on average, than 
consensus survey measures of inflation expectations over similar horizons (Scholtes 
2002).  
The literature that seeks to explain these findings investigates whether the Fisher 
hypothesis—the theoretical basis for the BEIR—is strictly applicable in the real world, 
where interest rates may contain premiums and distortions. Shen and Corning (2001) and 
Craig (2003) argue that the U.S. findings are due to the presence of a liquidity premium 
embedded in the BEIR. Shen and Corning further argue that variation in this premium 
may be the cause of the BEIR’s volatility. Sack (2000) finds that the mismatched cash 
flows of the indexed and conventional Treasuries and term-varying inflation expectations 
explain only a fraction of the variability of the BEIR. Emmons (2000) points out that U.S. 
nominal bonds of 10+ years to maturity may possess a scarcity value, which may in part 
explain why the U.S. BEIR is lower than survey measures of inflation expectations.
2 In 
the United Kingdom, there is evidence that the inflation-risk premium is more important 
than in the United States, and that it is possibly time-varying (Evans 1998).  
                                                 
2.   In addition, the status of the U.S. dollar as reserve currency may result in a disproportionate 
demand for nominal Treasuries, which would have the effect of lowering the BEIR.      
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Côté et al. (1996) argue that an inflation-risk premium and factors related to the small 
size of the Canadian RRB market make the level of the BEIR an unreliable indicator of 
the level of inflation expectations. Nonetheless, they hold out some hope that changes in 
the BEIR over time may be a good indicator of movements in long-term inflation 
expectations.  
3.  Premiums Embedded in the BEIR 
If investors are risk-neutral and markets efficiently price a homogeneous real interest rate 
across markets, the difference in yields between a zero-coupon index-linked bond and a 
zero-coupon nominal bond of similar maturity would express the market’s expected 
average inflation rate over the remaining period to maturity.
3 In this perfect world, the 
Fisher hypothesis is valid and the nominal interest rate is equal to the required real rate of 
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In the real world, however, the various assumptions that underlie the Fisher hypothesis 
may not hold strictly. The BEIR may contain distortions that mask the underlying 
information about inflation expectations. Nonetheless, even if the premiums and 
distortions were to shift the level of the BEIR away from “true” inflation expectations, 
the BEIR might still be a useful indicator if these distortions were relatively stable over 
time. If they were, changes in the BEIR would indicate when changes in inflation 
expectations were occurring. We are therefore interested not only in the magnitude of 
premiums and distortions, but the extent to which they may vary over time. 
3.1  Mismatched cash flows 
The RRB and nominal bond that are used to construct the BEIR have approximately the 
same maturity. Both bonds also pay a coupon, which complicates the comparison of their 
yields, because their cash flows are mismatched: the coupon payments of the RRB rise 
                                                 
3.   This is true apart from the effect of Jensen’s inequality, which means there is a negative 
bias in the BEIR.      
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with inflation, whereas those for the nominal bond are constant. Since the price of a bond 
is simply the sum of discounted cash flows, the two bonds will have different sensitivities 
to the expected path of real interest rates and real interest rate risk. As we discuss below, 
this will make the BEIR lower, on average, than true inflation expectations. In addition, 
mismatched cash flows will mean that changes in the expected path of real interest rates 
will cause the BEIR to fluctuate. 
3.2  Term-varying inflation expectations 
Another consequence of using coupon bonds to construct the BEIR is that it will be more 
sensitive to short-term inflation expectations than longer-term expectations. Implicit in 
the construction of the BEIR is an assumption that inflation expectations are roughly 
constant over the various horizons up to the maturity of the bonds. If both component 
bonds paid no coupon, this assumption would be innocuous. Instead, the nominal yields 
of these bonds are influenced by the expected path of inflation, and not just the expected 
average inflation over the period to maturity. As a result, when the term structure of 
inflation expectations—the set of expectations at increasing horizons—is not flat, a bias 
is introduced into the BEIR, and this bias is most sensitive to changes in inflation 
expectations at short horizons. This effect could be important, since short-term inflation 
expectations are likely to be more variable than long-term ones: inflation shocks are more 
likely to offset in the long term. Term-varying inflation expectations could temporarily 
change the level of the BEIR, thereby adding to its variability even when the expected 
average of inflation over the long run is unchanged. 
3.3  Inflation risk 
Inflation risk reflects the probability that the actual inflation rate will not match the 
expected inflation rate. A person’s inflation expectations are the mean of their subjective 
probability distribution for inflation, and inflation uncertainty is the variance around the 
mean. If inflation is significantly higher over the term of a nominal bond than was 
expected at the time of purchase, the realized real rate of return will be lower than the 
expected real rate of return. Investors in conventional bonds require compensation for 
this risk, which results in higher nominal yields ceteris paribus. In contrast to nominal      
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bonds, inflation risk is retained by the issuer of RRBs not passed on to the investor. For 
this reason, the BEIR contains a positive inflation-risk premium. 
The value of the protection from unexpected higher inflation should depend on the degree 
of uncertainty about future inflation and the degree of risk aversion.
4 The size of the 
inflation-risk premium will vary as inflation uncertainty changes. Inflation uncertainty is 
positively correlated with the level of inflation or inflation expectations, so the BEIR will 
tend to rise to a greater degree than the increase in inflation expectations. 
If the BEIR is to be used to indicate the credibility of the central bank, the existence of 
the inflation-risk premium is not a drawback, since uncertainty about future inflation 
developments must reflect investors’ views about the central bank’s willingness and 
ability to take actions to control future inflation. A lower or less-variable inflation-risk 
premium would signal increased credibility. 
3.4  Liquidity risk  
Liquidity risk is the risk that investors will not be able to sell an asset without incurring 
large costs either from the price pressure they create or the length of time it takes to sell 
their asset. In Canada, the secondary market for RRBs is much smaller than the market 
for nominal bonds, so there may be an important liquidity-risk premium differential. To 
compensate, investors may demand a higher expected return for this product, which 
would lead to a higher RRB yield and, ceteris paribus, a narrowing of the BEIR. This 
liquidity premium should decline over time as the RRB market develops, but this gradual 
decline should not be an important short-run source of variation in the BEIR. 
The amount of liquidity risk may vary over time, in line with the market’s perception of 
overall risk. In times of financial distress or rising economic uncertainty, investors are 
willing to pay a premium (accept a lower return) for the safest, most liquid assets. During 
these times, the RRB yields may rise and the nominal yields may fall, reducing the BEIR 
until investor behaviour returns to normal.  
                                                 
4.   Jensen’s inequality implies that, if investors are risk-neutral, the yield spread between real 
and nominal bonds will understate inflation expectations by an amount that increases with 
the uncertainty that surrounds inflation.      
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3.5  Market segmentation 
Côté et al. (1996) and Mayer (1998) argue that the BEIR may not reflect the market’s 
overall view on inflation expectations, but rather reflect the view of those with the 
highest inflation expectations or inflation-protection needs.  The argument that the RRB 
market is segmented, having investors with very different characteristics than average 
investors, requires that the supply of RRBs be relatively inelastic. If only a small amount 
of inflation-linked debt is supplied, it is likely to be owned by those who have the highest 
inflation expectations or the biggest need for inflation protection.  Inflation-sensitive  
investors may have higher forecasts of inflation or be more averse to inflation risk, and 
therefore value the certainty of RRBs more highly. If the RRB yield reflects their views 
and preferences, it will be lower, and the BEIR will be higher, than if the market was not 
segmented.  
In Canada, some investors are exempt from the taxes applicable to RRBs, which is 
another source of segmentation. The tax burden to RRB holders depends on inflation 
outcomes, since both income and capital gains taxes are applied to the inflation-uplifted 
coupon and principal components.
5 Life insurance companies and pension funds that are 
exempt from these taxes are willing to pay more for RRBs than the average investor. In 
addition, RRBs are attractive to these firms because they have real liabilities and need to 
match their assets to inflation.  
Market segmentation is not likely to lead to more variability in the BEIR on its own. It 
may, however, magnify the shifts in the BEIR that result from changes in inflation 
uncertainty. Changes in the degree of segmentation of the RRB market, perhaps as a 
result of changes in the tax code, would likely lead to permanent changes in the level of 
the BEIR. 
                                                 
5.   Given this tax treatment, the majority of RRBs are held by tax-exempt institutions or in tax-
exempt accounts, such as RRSPs. The tax implications are therefore a driving force behind 
the segmentation of the market. 
      
  8 
4.   RRBs: The Historical Experience 
The Government of Canada first 
issued RRBs in December 1991. 
Formal inflation targets, which 
specified the rate of inflation to be 
achieved over a 2-year horizon, 
were adopted in Canada in 
February of 1991, and 
subsequently lowered to the 
current target of 2.0 per cent. 
Figure 1 shows the RRB yield, the 
yield from a 30-year nominal 
Government of Canada bond, and 
the BEIR calculated from these 
two yields.  
Table 1 shows the sample means and measures of the variability of the nominal and real 
yields and the BEIR. The drop in the mean and variability of the BEIR in the latter half of 
the sample coincides with a drop in the mean and variability of the nominal yield, which 
is what we would expect if inflation expectations or inflation uncertainty were falling 
over the sample. The real yield also dropped, on average, in the latter half of the sample, 
but its variability was relatively unchanged. This is consistent with a fall in the liquidity 
premium.  
Figure 2 shows that the BEIR was above the inflation target (the midpoint of the target 
band is shown in the figure) in the early to mid-1990s, below it from late 1997 to late 
1999, and very close to target since that time. Longworth (2002) and others state that the 
Table 1: Full and Subsample Statistics, Nominal and Real Yields and BEIR 
  Mean    Standard deviation 
  1992–2003 1992–1997 1998–2003    1992–2003 1992–1997 1998–2003 
Nominal  6.83  8.02  5.64    1.35  0.86  0.26 
RRB  4.06  4.45  3.66    0.53  0.33  0.37 
BEIR  2.74  3.52  1.96    0.95  0.66  0.36 








91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03
Date
%
BEIR Nominal yield RRB yield     
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falling level of the BEIR between 
1992 and 1997 is consistent with 
monetary policy becoming more 
credible. 
Also shown in Figure 2 are three 
measures of inflation expectations 
from surveys of professional 
forecasters: the median expected 
average rate of inflation 4 to 14 
years ahead, from an annual 
survey conducted by Watson 
Wyatt; the mean expected average 
rate of inflation 6 to 10 years 
ahead, from a semi-annual survey by Consensus Economics; and 2-years-ahead inflation 
expectations, from the Conference Board’s quarterly Survey of Forecasters.
6 The BEIR is 
higher than the other measures of inflation expectations for the first half of the sample—
at times by more than 150 basis points. It registers both the highest reading (4.9 per cent 
in March 1992) of the four measures and the lowest reading (about 1.0 per cent in late 
1998). It also falls much more slowly than the survey measures. From 2000 to 2003, 
however, it was very close to 2.0 per cent, the middle of the Bank of Canada’s target 
range for inflation, along with the other measures of inflation expectations. Over this 
recent period, any permanent distortions to the level of the BEIR were either small or 
offsetting, on average.  
Even if all of these series were perfect measures of inflation expectations, we would not 
expect their levels to be identical over this sample, because they capture expectations 
over different horizons. For example, if a recent shock to inflation is expected to be short-
lived, we might expect near-term inflation expectations to rise with little impact on 
longer-term expectations. The measures of inflation expectations are, in fact, quite 
                                                 
6.   Two-years-ahead inflation is the expected rate of inflation for the following calendar year, 
rather than over the next 12 months. The other survey measures are defined similarly.  
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different. The mean level of the BEIR over the 1992 to 2002 sample is 2.8 per cent, 
above that of the 4- to 14-year expectations (2.5 per cent), the 6- to 10-year expectations 
(2.1 per cent), and the 2-years-ahead expectations (2.0 per cent). The longer the horizon 
over which the expectation applies, the higher its average over the past 11 years. This is 
consistent with slowly increasing monetary policy credibility, because expectations over 
longer horizons fall more slowly. It is puzzling, however, that the long-term measures are 
so different from each other. For example, it seems unlikely that there is enough 
additional information about inflation developments 10 to 30 years in the future to justify 
a difference of 0.8 percentage points between the BEIR and the 6- to 10-year survey 
measure. Such a wide difference may reflect uncertainty regarding the monetary policy 
regime over the longest horizons, or the influence of premiums embedded in the BEIR. 
The BEIR is the most variable measure, showing an average annual absolute change of 
0.56 percentage points, at least double that of the survey measures at any horizon. This is 
still true if we consider only the latter half of the sample. The first differences in those 
measures show very little correlation, which suggests that changes in one (or both) of 
these measures reflect some phenomenon other than changing inflation expectations.
7 On 
the basis of similar evidence, Shen and Corning (2001) argue that the U.S. BEIR may be 
too volatile to be a reliable proxy of inflation expectations. The higher peaks and lower 
troughs of the BEIR are mainly linked to two episodes: 1993–95, when the BEIR 
increased rapidly as other measures stabilized or fell, and 1997–99, when the BEIR 
dropped sharply while other measures fell moderately or flattened.  
5.   Calculating the BEIR 
The current value of a bond is the sum of its discounted future cash flows and principal 
(equation (2)). Using market data on bond prices (Bt), the coupon rate on the bond (c), 
and setting the value of principal to $100, we can solve for the yield to maturity (ytm) 
using this relationship. The ytm is the average annual return over the remaining life of the 
bond: 
                                                 
7.   Alternatively, longer-horizon expectations may behave differently.       
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.                       (2) 
In the case of a nominal bond, we obtain a nominal ytm. In the case of the RRB, we use 
the market price and the real coupon rate to obtain a real ytm. In the absence of 
distortions, the spread between the yield on a nominal 30-year Government of Canada 
bond and a 30-year RRB provides a measure of the expected average annual rate of 
inflation over the 30-year horizon. 
To understand the short-run impact of a large increase in the CPI on the RRB price, we 
need to consider how the RRB coupon payments are calculated. In this section, we follow 
the exposition of Sack and Elsasser (2004) closely. 
RRBs guarantee their holder a real return, protecting them from lower returns caused by 
inflation. To do so, the coupon payment and the principal repaid at maturity are adjusted 































+ ￿ .                      (3) 
An RRB issued at time t, with a real coupon rate c, a maturity of N years, and a par value 
of $100 has a coupon payment of ( ) t n t P P c + ￿ ￿100 , and returns a principal payment of 
( ) t N t P P+ ￿ 100  at maturity. The index ratio ( ) t n t P P+  is rewritten in equation (4) as 
( )
n e
t n, 1 p + , where 
e
t n, p  is the expected average annual rate of inflation over the next n 
periods.  t n i ,  is the n-period zero-coupon interest rate at time t (i.e., the return on a bond 
that pays no coupon and matures in period n). The set of  t n i ,  for all n periods gives the 
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Define the n-period zero-coupon real interest rate by the following: 















= + .                         (5) 
Equation (4) then becomes the following: 





















,                   (6) 
which is essentially the equation for valuing a nominal bond (equation (2)), except that 
coupon payments are discounted by real interest rates, rather than nominal ones. 
Therefore, we can derive the real ytm using only the fixed coupon rate and market 
information about the bond price. 
If future inflation is known, the returns from an investment making a real payment in n 
periods and one making a nominal payment must equate, which implies that  
















1 .                 (7) 
The yield spread between a nominal and an indexed zero-coupon bond should be equal to 
the expected average rate of inflation over the life of the bond when premiums are not 
present. When bonds also pay a coupon, however, this relationship becomes more 
complicated. The path of inflation affects the size of the coupon payments of the RRB 
and, as a result, different expected paths for inflation may cause the bond price to 
change—even when the average annual inflation rate over the life of the bond is kept 
constant. Under the assumption that inflation is expected to be stable at the level p  over 
time, we can replace the zero-coupon interest rates in equation (7) with the ytm from the  
RRB and nominal coupon bonds:  
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This equation can be approximated by i
ytm - r
ytm = p
e; however, the geometric difference 
(equation (8)) is usually used. The BEIR is supposed to capture the expected average 
annual inflation rate over the remaining life of the bond. 
6.    How Important Are the Risk Premiums/Distortions? 
If the BEIR is a biased measure of inflation expectations, it would be of greater use to 
policy-makers or investors if this bias could be estimated or removed. Alternatively, if 
the factors creating the bias are 
stable over time, then changes in 
the yield spread would reflect 
movements in long-run inflation 
expectations. Figure 3 shows the 
difference between the BEIR and 
the two measures of long-term 
inflation expectations as a proxy 
for the risk premiums in 
aggregate.
8 If survey expectations 
are the relevant benchmark, the 
differences should also capture any 
premium contained in the BEIR, 
and not just the inflation-risk premium. 
The proxies for the aggregate of the risk premiums are positive before 1997 and negative 
between 1997 and 1999. Between 1999 and 2003, they are somewhat smaller and take 
different signs, which suggests that the risk premiums were close to zero, on average, 
over this period. These proxies suggest that the impact of these premiums and distortions 
can be sizeable and different premiums must be active at different times. For example, 
the large and positive differential between the BEIR and surveys before 1997 might be an 
inflation-risk premium, but even if this premium went to zero it could not explain the 
                                                 
8.   Using the BEIR adjusted for the effect of the mismatched cash flows (described in section 
6.1) does not change this picture significantly.  















4 to 14 yr 6 to 10 yr     
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negative premium in the subsequent two years. In sections 6.1 to 6.5, we will use 
economic data and information available from financial markets to assess the likelihood 
that the differential between the BEIR and the surveys was due to risk premiums and 
distortions. 
One important caveat is that the individual distortions in the BEIR measure may not be 
independent of inflation expectations or each other. For example, inflation uncertainty 
will rise with inflation expectations. Also, higher inflation uncertainty may cause a larger 
change in the BEIR than it would if market participants had the same aversion as the 
average person to inflation risk. The importance of interactions between the distortions 
and inflation expectations is a subject for future research. These interactions will 
complicate any attempt to estimate the impact of these distortions econometrically. We 
examine these distortions independently as a first step.  
6.1   Mismatched cash flows 
Extracting inflation expectations by comparing the RRB ytm to that of a nominal bond of 
the same maturity may lead to a biased measure. Even though both assets have the same 
maturity, there are differences between the patterns of their coupon payments (i.e., the 
duration and the convexity of each bond may differ greatly, exposing each bond to 
different discount factors). These differences will influence the yield spread between the 
securities for reasons unrelated to expected future inflation, and will introduce a bias 
when measuring inflation expectations. This bias will not be constant through time, 
because the size of the impact on the BEIR is a function of (i) the coupon and maturity of 
the real and nominal bonds, and (ii) the term structure of interest rates.
9  
Typically, payments on an RRB are more back-loaded than those of a standard nominal 
coupon bond. Expressed in real terms, the payments of the RRB are fixed, while those of 
the nominal security decline over its maturity as inflation erodes their real value. Since 
                                                 
9.   In practice, the 30-year nominal bonds and RRB do not have the same maturity. Since the 
beginning of the RRB program, mismatches of up to six years have been observed. This 
will directly influence the impact of mismatched cash flows.       
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payments that arrive later in time are usually more heavily discounted, the RRB price will 
be lower, and therefore the BEIR will be narrower.  
In a study of Treasury inflation-indexed securities (TIIS) in the United States, Sack 
(2000) compares two measures of inflation expectations: the standard BEIR (i.e., yield 
difference, as shown in equation (8)) and a measure that takes the slope of the yield curve 
and mismatched cash flows into account. He finds that adjusting for mismatched cash 
flows has only a modest impact on the BEIR. Those results, however, need not apply to 
the Canadian context, because in the United States inflation expectations are derived 
from 10-year bonds. In Canada, only RRBs that have a maturity of 30 years have been 
issued, which allows for greater mismatched cash flows. 
Instead of comparing the ytm of the RRB with that of a nominal bond, we extract 
inflation expectations by comparing the ytm of the RRB with that of a synthetic nominal 
bond (created from a zero-coupon yield curve) that has exactly the same stream of cash 
flows as the RRB. Stated differently, by discounting the cash flows with a zero-coupon 
curve, we solve iteratively for the constant inflation expectation that is consistent with the 
observed price.
10  
Our methodology relies heavily on the quality of the zero-coupon yield curve. We use the 
Merrill Lynch exponential-spline methodology to extract the yield curve (Brenner et al. 
2001), as calculated by Bolder, Johnson, and Metzler (forthcoming). In a recent study, 
Bolder and Gusba (2002) find this methodology to be the most accurate. 
 
 
                                                 
10.   The RRB price data we use do not take into account all information regarding known past 
inflation. To get a daily or weekly RRB price, a CPI index ratio (the ratio of the current 
price level to the price level at the bond’s issue date) of the same frequency is required. By 
convention, the CPI index ratio used to calculate the RRB price at the first of the month is 
the CPI from the third preceding month divided by the CPI at issuance. In subsequent 
trading days, the index ratio is calculated using linear interpolation from the third preceding 
month to the second preceding month to the CPI for the next month (which is already 
available). We adjust our measure to take this into account by using the latest CPI data 
when they become available.      
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Figure 5: Impact of Cash Flow Mismatch on the 
BEIR















Figure 4 shows a weekly measure of the BEIR adjusted for mismatched cash flows 
(hereafter, the adjusted BEIR) versus the BEIR. Both measures are reasonably close 
throughout the period. From time to time, however, important differences occur. Figure 5 
shows the difference between the two measures, which capture the bias introduced by 
mismatched cash flows. The average bias over the entire sample (January 1992 to May 
2003) was 20 basis points (bps) (Table 2). In other words, inflation expectations 
computed from the standard measure would understate inflation expectations by 20 basis 
points, on average. Over a more recent period (January 1999 to May 2003), the average 
bias was 8 basis points. 














Level  -0.20  0.14  -0.59  0.12  -0.55  0.08  Jan 92 to 
May 03  First 
difference  0.00  0.04  -0.24  0.31  -0.13  0.11 
Level  -0.08  0.09  -0.31  0.12  -0.29  0.10  Jan 99 to 
May 03  First 
difference  0.00  0.03  -0.14  0.26  -0.07  0.07 
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Figure 5 also shows that the difference between both measures is volatile and non-
stationary. From January 1992 to May 2003, the standard deviation was 14 basis points 
and the minimum and maximum differences were -59 and 12 basis points, respectively. 
The maximum positive and negative weekly variations were 12 and -31 basis points     
(26 basis points and -14 basis points over the more recent period). This analysis suggests 
that changes in the BEIR may be due to the mismatched cash flows and not to changes in 
inflation expectations. These results differ strongly from those obtained by Sack (2000), 
who finds that the impact of mismatched cash flows for the U.S. BEIR is small, typically 
under 5 basis points, and much less volatile. Our results imply that Sack’s conclusions do 
not apply to BEIRs that are calculated using bonds of longer maturities. 
6.1.1  The impact of mismatched cash flows and the shape of the yield curve 
The different cash-flow structures of the RRB and nominal bond result in the bonds 
having different durations and different ytm if the yield curve is not flat.  The cash flows 
of an RRB are more back-loaded, leading to a higher modified duration.
11  We define 
modified duration as the exposure of a bond to real interest rate variation (modified 
duration = dp/dr).
12  Figure 6 plots the modified durations (measured in years) of the two 
bonds used to measure inflation expectations. Throughout the period, the nominal bond 
duration has increased and the duration difference has narrowed, mainly due to falling 
nominal rates. Figure 7 shows that the bias (the difference between the BEIR and the 
adjusted BEIR) is partly explained by duration variations. Particularly, large shifts in 
duration due to the issuance of new benchmark bonds have had an important impact on 
the BEIR. For example, in November 2001, a new RRB was introduced to the market, 
which increased the benchmark’s duration by 1.9 years. This shift in duration led to a 
decline of 26 basis points in the measure of the bias. Therefore, the level and variation of 
the BEIR not only reflect inflation expectations, but also the different exposures of each 
bond to interest rate risk. 
                                                 
11.   We use duration as a proxy for the cash-flow structure. 
12.   See Rudolph-Shabinsky and Trainer (1999) for more details on the duration of inflation-
indexed securities.      
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The bias is also a function of the term structure. The BEIR is especially sensitive to the 
yields at the long end of the curves (the 20- to 30-year maturity range), given the long  
maturity of the component bonds. In October 1996, the yield curve was particularly steep, 
which caused the BEIR to understate inflation expectations by 31 basis points. In March 
2000, it was relatively flat and inverted (i.e., 30-years ytm, significantly lower than the 
20-years ytm), and inflation expectations were overstated by 10 basis points. This 
analysis suggests that the BEIR is relatively sensitive to the term structure, and that 
accounting for it will improve the measure of inflation expectations from RRBs.   
 
6.2  The term structure of inflation expectations 
Sack (2000) finds that the BEIR in the U.S. showed a surprising degree of responsiveness 
to the contemporaneous rate of CPI inflation between the beginning of 1997 and the end 
of 1999. This may have also been true in Canada, since the Canadian BEIR tracks 
Canadian CPI inflation much closer than surveyed expectations in this period       
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(Figure 8).
13 There is also evidence 
that the Canadian BEIR has 
explanatory power for   
1-year-ahead inflation expectations 
in the post-1997 sample (IMF 
2004).  
In this section, we consider the 
extent to which current CPI can 
affect the BEIR even when longer-
term inflation expectations are 
unchanged. This can occur because 
the current CPI helps form short-
term inflation expectations. Recall that, because of the coupon structure of the component 
bonds, the BEIR will be more sensitive to short-term inflation expectations than to 
longer-term expectations. In other words, because of the coupon structure, the nominal 
ytm of an RRB will be a function of the inflation path. An expected temporary increase in 
inflation tomorrow raises the expected coupon payments over the entire life of the bond, 
whereas an equal increase in inflation expectations one year before maturity increases 
only the final two coupon payments. In each case, the impact on the actual average rate of 
inflation over the period to maturity is identical, but investors are willing to pay more 
nominal dollars for RRBs in the first case. Similarly, the nominal ytm of nominal bonds is 
a function of the overall zero-coupon curve (see the appendix for the derivation). 
Therefore, when the term structure of inflation expectations is not constant, a bias is 
introduced into the BEIR, and this bias is biggest when short-term inflation changes. 
To measure the sensitivity of the BEIR to the inflation-expectations term structure, we 
solve equation (4) using a flat real-yield curve (and a consistent nominal curve computed 
using the Fisher relationship) and a variety of inflation paths consistent with differing 
                                                 
13.   Figure 8 shows CPI inflation excluding the impact of changes in indirect taxes. 
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short-term and long-term inflation expectations.
14,15 This gives the net present value of 
the RRB in each case. Next, we put that price, along with the fixed coupon rate, into 
equation (6), to get the real ytm consistent with our hypothetical profiles of beliefs about 
future inflation. We then calculate the spread between the real ytm and a ytm for a 
nominal bond to obtain our measure of inflation expectations.  
The sensitivity analysis reported in Table 3 shows the BEIR that would be obtained under 
different levels of short-term inflation expectations that last for varying lengths of time 
before returning to the inflation target. For example, if inflation is expected to be 3.0 per 
cent for the next six months and 2.0 per cent for the remainder of the 30 years to 
maturity, we should observe a BEIR of 2.03 per cent. But if we assume that inflation is 
going to be 5 per cent for six months, then a consistent BEIR would be 2.08 per cent. In 
general, the difference is less between the BEIR and long-term inflation forward rates 
(2.0 per cent in this example) when the credibility of the targeting regime is high, since 
shocks to inflation become less persistent. This may be one reason for the reduced 
volatility of the BEIR shown in Table 1. 
Interim period of high 
expected inflation before 
returning to the target 
(2%)
6 months 2.03% 2.02% 2.05% 2.03% 2.08% 2.05% 2.21% 2.13%
1 year 2.05% 2.03% 2.11% 2.07% 2.16% 2.10% 2.42% 2.26%
2 years 2.10% 2.07% 2.21% 2.13% 2.31% 2.20% 2.83% 2.51%
5 years 2.25% 2.17% 2.50% 2.33% 2.76% 2.49% 4.05% 3.29%
7 years 2.34% 2.23% 2.69% 2.46% 3.03% 2.69% 4.83% 3.81%
10 years 2.47% 2.33% 2.94% 2.66% 3.42% 2.99% 5.94% 4.60%
15 years 2.65% 2.50% 3.30% 3.00% 3.97% 3.49% 7.52% 5.92%
30 years 3.00% 3.00% 4.00% 4.00% 5.00% 5.00% 10.00% 10.00%
Table 3: The BEIR under Different Inflation Term Structures














Table 3 also provides the average inflation rate for the 30-year horizon, assuming that the 
path of inflation is exactly as was expected. The BEIR will overstate average inflation 
                                                 
14.   We do not need a new yield curve for each inflation path, since we are trying to find paths 
that are consistent with observed nominal interest rates. 
15.   The computed BEIRs in Tables 3 and 4 assume a 30-year maturity with a 5.75 per cent 
semi-annual coupon rate nominal bond and a 30-year maturity with a 4.00 per cent semi-
annual coupon RRB. These coupon rates are similar to recent benchmarks.      
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expectations when short-term expectations are higher than those for the longer term  
(i.e., the term structure of inflation expectations is downward sloping). For example, if 
inflation is expected to be 5 per cent for the next 10 years and 2 per cent for the 
subsequent 20 years, the BEIR would be 3.42 per cent, even though actual average 
inflation expectations over 30 years are 2.99 per cent.  
Table 4 shows the impact (in basis points) on 
the BEIR of a 1 per cent increase in inflation 
expectations for a six-month period with 
different starting dates. A 1 per cent shock to 
inflation that lasts six months will increase the 
average actual inflation by 1.7 basis points, 
regardless of when it happens. If expected 
inflation over the first six months rises by    
1.0 per cent, however, the BEIR will increase 
by 2.8 basis points. If, instead, the inflation 
rate expected over the last six months before maturity rises by 1.0 per cent, the BEIR will 
change by only 0.8 basis points. 
To assess the possible impact, we need to investigate the extent to which inflation 
expectations with different horizons can diverge. The experience of countries with index-
linked bonds of different maturities suggests that expectations over different horizons do 
diverge. Figure 2 shows that survey measures for different horizons also differ. Typical 
divergences, however, are insufficient to create a significant bias in the measure of 
average inflation expectations. We estimate that the typical bias will not be bigger than   
3 to 4 basis points. Nonetheless, this effect adds volatility to the measure of inflation 
expectations, because it increases the sensitivity of the BEIR to short-term inflation 
expectations. Furthermore, the bias will most likely be at its maximum (approximately  
10 basis points) at critical times, perhaps following a large relative price shock, when 
monetary authorities will be looking for evidence that the bias is feeding into inflation 
expectations. 
6 months 1% inflation 
shock (bps)
0 to 6 months 2.7 1.7
6 to 12 months 2.6 1.7
18 months to 2 years 2.6 1.7
4.5 to 5 years 2.3 1.7
6.5 to 7 years 2.2 1.7
9.5 to 10 years 2.0 1.7
14.5 to 15 years 1.6 1.7
29.5 to 30 years 0.8 1.7
Table 4: Impact of Forward Inflation-
Expectations Shock
bps
BEIR (left) and average inflation (right)     
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The simultaneous decline in the BEIR and contemporaneous CPI inflation in the 1997–98 
period is probably not due to bias from term-varying inflation expectations. An 
alternative argument is that this period was characterized by a large shift in the liquidity 
premium that happened at the same time as the drop in inflation. Large subsequent 
fluctuations in inflation were not matched by large movements in the BEIR. We explore 
this hypothesis in section 6.4. 
6.3  Inflation-risk premium 
Little empirical work has been done on the existence of an inflation-uncertainty premium 
in nominal yields and its importance for the level of changes in the BEIR. The existing 
work often uses the difference between variants of the BEIR and survey measures of 
expected inflation as a proxy for the inflation-uncertainty premium, despite the possibility 
that it includes other distortions. Evans (1998) finds a positive and significant correlation 
between the level of his U.K. BEIR and this proxy, providing evidence for a time-varying 
inflation-uncertainty premium.
16 In a study of index-linked bonds in Israel, Kandel, Ofer, 
and Sarig (1996) regress this proxy on another measure of inflation uncertainty—lags of 
the monthly dispersion of relative prices in a consumer price index—and find a positive 
and significant relationship.
17 The relationship is not significant in a low-inflation 
subsample. Both Evans (1998) and Kandel, Ofer, and Sarig (1996) consider BEIRs that 
have much shorter horizons than the ones in our work. Côté et al. (1996) use similar 
reasoning in their analysis of the Canadian BEIR, arguing that its rise in 1994, when 
other survey measures of long-run inflation expectations were flat or declining, suggests 
that the inflation-risk premium was rising. Campbell and Shiller (1996) use a capital-
asset-pricing model to estimate the inflation-risk premium in the United States and find it 
to be between 50 and 100 basis points.  
                                                 
16.   Evans argues that this is not due to forecast errors in the survey measure, because he 
obtains similar results when the left-hand-side variable is the difference between the 
interest rate measure and realized inflation.  
17.   Kandel, Ofer, and Sarig justify this proxy with the following example: in a given month, 
investors do not transact in all goods included in the CPI basket, so they are likely to get a 
less-accurate picture of inflation when relative price variability is high. For this reason, if 
the most recent CPI release shows a large degree of relative price dispersion, investors will 
be more uncertain about their current views on inflation.      
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Figure 9 shows two measures of long-run 
inflation uncertainty. The first is a 
measure of the disagreement among the 
forecasters who responded to the Watson 
Wyatt survey, calculated as the difference 
between the upper and lower quartiles of 
reported inflation expectations.
18 The 
second is a measure of inflation 
uncertainty over a 5-year forecast horizon 
derived from a generalized autoregressive 
conditional heteroscedasticity (GARCH) 
model developed by Crawford and 
Kasumovich (1996).
19  
Both measures of inflation uncertainty fail to indicate a rise in inflation uncertainty in 
1994, or an important decline in 1997. Crawford and Kasumovich’s measure of inflation 
uncertainty fell dramatically during the 1980s, but has been relatively stable since 1992. 
If inflation uncertainty has changed little, it cannot be driving the movement of the BEIR. 
Survey disagreement fell between 1991 and 1994. It also fluctuated to a greater degree 
than the GARCH measure, but not during the 1994 or 1997 periods, when the BEIR was 
moving in the opposite direction from the survey measures. In addition, although the 
timing varies, more forward-looking Markov regime-switching models of inflation 
uncertainty show a similar trend over the 1980s and 1990s (e.g., Demers 2003). Based on 
this evidence, the deviations of the BEIR from survey measures of inflation expectations 
do not appear to result from changing inflation uncertainty.  
                                                 
18.   Giordani and Söderlind (2003) argue that disagreement on point forecasts from survey 
respondents has a high correlation with movements in more theoretically appealing 
measures of uncertainty. 
19.   Similar analyses were undertaken using long-term swaption implied volatilities as a proxy 
for long-term inflation uncertainties in the subsample 1997–2003. We were not able to 
identify any relationship. 
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The measures of inflation uncertainty are contrary to the explanation given by Côté et al. 
(1996) for the events in 1994. They argue that this rise in the BEIR was related to 
concerns about the ability of governments to deal with their rising debt in the context of 
increasing world interest rates. In this environment, investors saw an increased risk that 
government would resort to higher inflation to ease the costs of servicing government 
debt. This view would have been particularly relevant to investors in government bond 
markets, but perhaps it had little impact on the expectations or uncertainty of those 
outside the bond markets. Côté et al. also note that similar movements in the nominal–
real interest rate spread in this period were observed in other countries with index-linked 
bonds. 
 
6.4   Liquidity-risk premium  
Investors may demand a higher yield on RRBs to compensate for the risk that they will 
not be able to sell them quickly or will have to sell at unfavourable prices. If this 
liquidity-risk premium is present, it should fall over time as more RRBs are issued and 
traded.  Even then, however, this premium may rise during episodes when investors 
experience a heightened need for assets that are highly liquid. A dramatic deterioration in 
liquidity, if there was one, might explain the declining differential between the BEIR and 
survey measures of inflation expectations over the mid-1990s. 
In fact, there has been an improvement in liquidity since the beginning of the RRB 
program. The stock of RRBs outstanding increased from $4.1 billion at the end of 1994 
to $17.3 billion at the end of 2003, rising from 9 per cent to 26 per cent of federal 
government marketable debt with a maturity of 10 years or greater. The greater supply of 
debt should have improved liquidity, ceteris paribus. 
The secondary market for RRBs is still much smaller than the market for nominal bonds 
in Canada. The average monthly RRB trading volume in 2003 was $1.6 billion, only 
slightly above the earlier peak of $1.5 billion in 1997, despite the increase in the 
outstanding stock of RRBs. Secondary market RRB turnover, the ratio of the volume 
traded to the stock outstanding, is less than one-fifth that of nominal bonds with a      
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maturity of 10 years or more (Table 5). Moreover, the turnover ratio for RRBs has been 
relatively low since it peaked in 1997.  
 
There is some evidence for improved liquidity in secondary markets. The typical bid/ask 
spread on the benchmark RRB has fallen from around 15 cents before 1997 to about      
10 cents in 2003. Bid/ask spreads in the RRB market have moved closer to those of the 
nominal 30-year benchmark bond. Market participants have stated that liquidity in the 
secondary market for RRBs has improved over time, but remains low compared with its 
nominal counterpart,
20 in part because RRB investors typically buy the security and hold 
it to maturity. This assertion is consistent with the observed low turnover. Accordingly, if 
most RRB investors are buy-and-hold types, the premium demanded for liquidity risk 
must be quite small. A declining liquidity penalty, however, should result in an increasing 
BEIR, ceteris paribus, so it cannot account for the decline in the BEIR in the post-1997 
sample. 
Nonetheless, the liquidity-risk premium may have risen significantly during periods of   
market turbulence; for example, in 1997–98, the Russian debt crisis and the collapse of 
Long-Term Capital Management increased investors’ desire for liquid assets. One would 
expect the real yield to rise as investors demand a higher return to compensate for higher 
liquidity risk. The decline in the BEIR, however, is due largely to a drop in the nominal 
yield, rather than to a large increase in the real yield.
21 The falling BEIR may reflect a 
generalized flight by investors to more liquid securities from illiquid assets other than 
RRBs.  
                                                 
20.   See the Bank of Canada’s “2003 Market Consultations on Real Return Bonds,” available at 
http://www.bankofcanada.ca/en/notices_fmd/market_consult03.htm. 
21.   It is also possible that the rising liquidity premium was offset by some other factor, such as 
a decline in the expected future real interest rates.  
Table 5: Average Monthly Turnover 
Volume traded/bonds outstanding, %  1994 1997 1998 2003
Nominal government bonds, maturity over 10 years  92 95 83 44
Real Return Bonds  15 18 10 8     
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Shen and Corning (2001) use the yield spread between on-the-run and off-the-run 
conventional 10-year U.S. Treasuries as a proxy for the liquidity premium, since the only 
difference between these bonds is the lower liquidity of the off-the-run Treasury. Since 
Treasury inflation-indexed securities are even less liquid than the off-the-run Treasuries, 
this spread is considered a lower bound on the liquidity premium embedded in the TIPS. 
From this measure, Shen and Corning conclude that the liquidity premium in U.S. TIPS 
yields rose during the 1997–98 period.  
We calculate a similar measure 
for Canada based on the 30-year 
nominal Government of Canada 
bond. In Canada, the off-the-run 
bond has a shorter maturity than 
the on-the-run bond by at least 
two years, which means that the 
proxy may be affected by 
movement in the long end of the 
yield curve to a greater degree 
than in the Shen and Corning 
measure. Since this proxy is 
only a lower bound, conclusions about the size of the premium are not possible. Though 
two peaks in this proxy occur in 1997 and the fall of 1998 (Figure 10), it is low for most 
of the 1997–98 period, providing further evidence that the liquidity-risk premium in 
RRBs is not the main reason for the low BEIR over this period. 
6.5   Market segmentation 
Côté et al. (1996) suggest that demand for RRBs may be subject to a “clientele effect,” 
which means that a subset of investors who possess a stronger-than-average aversion to 
inflation uncertainty or higher inflation expectations have a disproportionate impact on 
RRB yields. In Canada, as in most countries, a large portion of RRBs are held by life 
insurance and pension funds, mainly because their liabilities rise with inflation and they 
are exempt from paying tax on the returns. This subset of investors would be willing to 
Figure 10: Liquidity Measure
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accept a lower real return than the average investor, or, alternatively, would be willing to 
pay more for inflation protection.  
The pricing of RRBs should reflect the behaviour of only this subset of investors if RRBs 
are in short supply. This would occur if the supply and expected supply of RRBs and 
close substitutes were very inelastic.
22 As described, however, the “clientele effect” 
contrasts with theories on market efficiency. One might expect supply constraints in the 
short term (e.g., rigid government funding policies or lack of awareness of inflation-
linked structures by corporations), but supply should adjust in the long run to take 
advantage of lower funding costs. As a result, the expected supply of RRBs should not be 
inelastic.  
Mayer (1998) provides a hypothetical example to illustrate the clientele effect. He argues 
that, in an economy where 5 per cent of the debt is linked to inflation, the supply of 
indexed-linked debt is fixed, and no substitutes exist, the BEIR should reflect the views 
of the 5 per cent of investors with the highest inflation expectations. Using the available 
data from Watson Wyatt, we plot in Figure 11 the surveyed maximum and upper quartile 
cut-off of inflation expectations, and the BEIR. Until 1996, the BEIR is usually inside the 
upper quartile of inflation 
expectations, and subsequently it falls 
below this range.  
Figure 11 is consistent with the 
existence of a clientele-effect 
distortion in the RRB market in its 
early years (1991–96). In 1991, 
Canada became the only supplier of 
inflation-linked securities in North 
America. Also, it is unlikely that 
investors expected a strong increase 
                                                 
22.   Many have argued that a well-diversified equity portfolio or short-term fixed-income 
securities offer inflation protection (for example, see Campbell and Shiller 1996). 
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in supply, because the Canadian RRB program was expected to grow slowly. Consistent 
with the expected tight supply, the BEIR at that time may have reflected the views of 
investors who had higher-than-average inflation forecasts or an aversion to inflation 
uncertainty. It is interesting that the break in the relationship between the BEIR and the 
upper quartile diminished in 1996, when the United States announced the launch of the 
TIPS program. Not only did TIPS provide a better global supply and expected supply 
through government issuance, it may have raised expectations about the development of a 
market for corporate inflation-linked securities and led to more interest in, or acceptance 
of, Canadian RRBs.  
As the inflation-linked security market matures, the clientele effect should diminish. An 
increased awareness among investors and issuers, and developments in other countries, 
such as the emergence of the U.S. CPI futures market, suggest that the RRB market will 
continue to develop. 
7.    Inflation Expectations 
In the previous sections, we discussed the evidence for risk premiums and distortions in 
the BEIR. If premiums and distortions are unable to account for the movements in the 
BEIR over history, there is a higher probability that it reflected long-term inflation 
expectations. If the BEIR’s movements reflect either inflation expectations or the 
inflation-risk premium, then it should be a good indicator of the credibility of monetary 
policy.  Of course, our conclusions can only be as strong as our ability to identify the risk 
premiums and distortions. 
Over the 1990s, it is likely that most of these premiums and distortions were present in 
some form. The mismatched cash flows of the two component bonds of the BEIR had an 
important effect on the BEIR, especially in the early to mid-1990s. Correcting for this 
bias, however, increases the divergence between the BEIR and survey measures of 
inflation expectations. The impact of term-varying inflation expectations is too small to 
explain the swings in the BEIR. Given the inferior liquidity of the RRB market relative to 
that for nominal bonds, we would expect that a liquidity premium was embedded in the 
BEIR. If a liquidity premium did exist, it was dominated by other distortions until the 
1997–98 period. From 1997–98, heightened investor demand for liquid assets may have      
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lowered conventional bond yields, reducing the BEIR even if it had only minor effects on 
RRB yields. A measure of the survey disagreement provides some evidence that the 
inflation-uncertainty premium was still falling until about 1993, but this decline is too 
early to explain the decline in the BEIR. The small and segmented RRB market meant 
that the marginal RRB investor was willing to accept a lower real yield than typical 
investors in other markets, possibly due to their higher inflation expectations, greater 
inflation risk aversion, or special tax status. Although other factors are present, this is a 
leading candidate to explain much of the divergence between the BEIR and surveys until 
1997.  
Given these findings, there is reason to doubt that the BEIR was a good measure of 
credibility before 1997. It may have indicated the inflation expectations, inflation risk, 
and risk aversion of a set of market participants who had more extreme views than most 
other people. If their changing views differed from the average investor in magnitude, but 
not direction, the BEIR might have been a useful warning signal that a more generalized 
change in credibility was likely.  
It seems implausible that changes in long-run inflation expectations were consistent with 
movements in the BEIR in 1994. At that time, the consensus on the 6- to 10-years-ahead 
inflation expectations rose slightly, but the 4- to 14-year survey measures did not. Since 
the upper quartile of the 4- to 14-year survey fell slightly, the rise in the BEIR at that time 
was probably not due to higher long-term inflation expectations among those with more 
extreme views (Figure 11). We are unable to provide any evidence to support Côté et 
al.’s report of an increase in the inflation-risk premium in 1994, although a large body of 
empirical research argues that it would rise with inflation expectations.  
In 1998, declines in the long-run expectations are more plausible. The BEIR fell below 
target in a context of heightened investor demand for liquidity, but we have found little 
evidence to explain the persistence of this effect. Since it is not easily identified by a 
persistent increase in the real yield, it is possible that long-term inflation expectations 
also dropped at the time.  A decline in long-run inflation expectations is consistent with 
the sharp tightening of monetary policy in the fall of 1998, because the average annual 
inflation rate (CPI excluding taxes) over the previous six years had been below target       
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(1.5 per cent). If this decline was partly because of lower long-term inflation 
expectations, it was not enough to suggest a serious deterioration in credibility, since the 
BEIR remained within the target bands.  
Over the four years from 2000 to 2003, survey measures of inflation expectations were 
relatively stable and near 2.0 per cent. Over the same period, the mean of the BEIR was 
2.2 per cent, and 95 per cent of the time it was between 1.8 and 2.6 per cent. If surveys 
are an appropriate benchmark, this suggests that, in total, the premiums were small 
relative to the past and the BEIR better reflected the expected average rate of inflation 
over the subsequent 30 years. 
The variability of the BEIR has fallen over the sample, but from week to week it is not 
uncommon to see changes of up to 17 basis points in either direction. This volatility 
seems contrary to the widely held view that long-term inflation expectations are relatively 
stable. Though the premiums and distortions that we have identified are likely much 
smaller today than in the early 1990s, we cannot say that they are zero in any given short 
period. In fact, the BEIR has risen above the survey measures again in 2004, raising 
questions about our ability to interpret its movements (Reid, Dion, and Christensen 
2004). Since short-term distortions may still occur, it is prudent to look at trends in the 
BEIR over a longer period.  
Although we have examined the premiums and distortions that are most prevalent in the 
literature, it is possible that other factors will at times influence the BEIR. Recently, some 
observers have argued that a re-evaluation of equity risk after the sharp declines in equity 
markets is driving strong demand for alternative means to hedge against inflation and 
increase portfolio diversification.
23 This search for alternative inflation hedges may have 
increased investor demand for RRBs. Because of the relatively fixed short-run supply of 
index-linked debt, this demand could drive the real yield on RRBs temporarily below the 
long-run expected real interest rate, thereby raising the BEIR.   
                                                 
23.   See the Bank of Canada’s “2003 Market Consultations on Real Return Bonds,” available at 
http://www.bankofcanada.ca/en/notices_fmd/market_consult03.htm.      
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8.    Forecasting Power 
If the BEIR is able to forecast average rates of inflation over the subsequent 30 years, its 
value as an indicator of inflation would be clear. It would also suggest that the premiums 
discussed above are of little practical importance. If its forecast performance is poor, 
however, it is less clear what conclusion could be drawn. A measure that accurately 
captures inflation expectations could forecast poorly simply because people are bad long-
run forecasters, or because long-run forecasts are particularly difficult to do. Indeed, 
measures of inflation expectations may be poor at forecasting, since policy may react to 
the expectations themselves. It may be more relevant to know what financial market 
participants expect than whether they are correct, since their expectations have an impact 
on today’s long-term interest rates (Hetzel 1992). 
The relatively short span of the data does not permit us to compare the level of the BEIR 
with the average rate of inflation over the subsequent 30 years.
24 There is some evidence 
from the United Kingdom, where inflation-linked government bonds at various maturities 
have existed for more than 20 years, that interest rate measures are useful to forecast 
inflation at short horizons. Scholtes (2002) finds that the forecast accuracy of break-even 
inflation forward rates, constructed using index-linked gilts with a 2-year maturity, is 
better than that of survey measures of inflation expectations. Earlier work by Breedon 
and Chadha (1997) suggests that inflation forecasts derived from the real and nominal 
term structure of interest rates are at least as good at forecasting future changes in 
inflation as macroeconomic models. Barr and Campbell (1997) find that measures of 
inflation expectations calculated from the U.K. government’s nominal and indexed debt 
forecast inflation more accurately than do nominal yields at the 1-year horizon.  
The BEIR should be influenced by inflation expectations over many different horizons, 
and we are also interested in determining whether the BEIR contains useful information 
about inflation (CPI excluding taxes and core inflation) over a policy-relevant horizon. 
Instead of assessing the forecast performance of the BEIR for long-term inflation, we 
                                                 
24.   This is partly because the government issuance of RRBs is relatively recent, but also 
because these securities have long maturities and therefore require a long time series to 
rigorously assess the BEIR’s forecasting properties.      
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examine the forecast performance for short- and medium-term inflation relative to other 
measures of inflation expectations. In particular, we examine a 6-months-ahead forecast 
from the Conference Board of Canada’s Business Confidence Survey (quarterly); the       
2-years-ahead consensus forecast for the Conference Board’s Survey of Forecasters 
(quarterly); and the 6- to 10-years-ahead expected average inflation rate from Consensus 
Economics (semi-annual).
25 We also include the forecast performance of simple averages 
of past inflation, for comparison. Tables 6 and 7 compare the forecast accuracy of various 
indicators for realized year-over-year inflation rate one, two, and three years ahead. 
As Table 6 shows, the BEIR has the worst forecast performance for CPI excluding taxes 
in terms of root mean squared errors (RMSEs). Over all horizons, survey measures and 
even backward-looking past average inflation rates have lower RMSEs than the BEIR. 
The volatility in the BEIR caused by premiums and distortions that were active in the 
first part of the sample is one potential explanation for its poor near-term forecast 
performance. The 6- to 10-year survey expectations are a long-run measure, however, 
and they have a much better forecast performance, with RMSEs that are roughly half as 
large as those of the BEIR. This survey measure of long-term inflation was much closer 
to the inflation target for the whole sample. The best forecast performance over all 
forecast horizons comes from the expectations surveys. Surprisingly, there is little 
difference in forecast performance between surveys of short-term inflation expectations 
and those for the long term, even at the 1-year horizon. 
If we calculate RMSEs using only the latter half of the sample, a different picture 
emerges. The BEIR’s forecast performance improves substantially from an RMSE of 
about 1.8 percentage points at the 2-year horizon to 1.2 percentage points. Over this 
sample, it has lower RMSEs than the backward-looking measures of inflation 
expectations and performs similarly to the survey measures. In contrast, the forecast 
performance of the medium- and long-term survey measures does not improve in the  
                                                 
25.   We did not use the 4- to 14-year forecast conducted by Watson Wyatt, because of 
insufficient data.      
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latter subsample. The improved performance of the BEIR may indicate that inflation 
expectations over a very long horizon have become more tightly linked to the inflation 
targets (and therefore to realized inflation) over the past few years. Enhanced policy 
credibility manifested in a lower, and less volatile, inflation-risk premium may explain 
why the BEIR’s forecast performance has improved and why the performance of the 
survey measures has not. This is equally consistent, however, with the reduced impact of 
the risk premiums and other distortions in the BEIR measure. Nonetheless, in light of our 
earlier findings, the relatively good forecast performance of the BEIR in the second half 
of the sample should not be due to an oversensitivity to short-term inflation expectations. 
Table 6: RMSEs of the BEIR and Other Measures of Inflation Expectations for Total 
CPI Inflation, Excluding Taxes 
  Forecast horizon 
  1 year 2 years  3 years    1 year  2 years 3 years 
  Sample starting 1992    Sample starting 1998 
BEIR               
BEIR  1.67  1.82  1.80    1.02  1.15  0.97 
Naïve measures               
Inflation over the past 12 months  1.16  1.07  1.06    1.46  1.40  1.27 
Inflation over the past 24 months  1.01  1.00  1.02    1.24  1.23  1.23 
Inflation over the past 36 months  0.97  0.98  1.08    1.12  1.17  1.28 
Survey measures               
6 months ahead  0.85  0.84  0.79    1.02  1.10  0.94 
2 years ahead  0.86  0.92  0.90    0.93  1.10  1.00 




Table 7: RMSEs of the BEIR and Other Measures of Inflation Expectations for Core 
Inflation 
  Forecast horizon 
  1 year 2 years  3 years    1 year  2 years 3 years 
  Sample starting 1992    Sample starting 1998 
BEIR               
BEIR  1.28  1.48  1.64    0.45  0.48  0.62 
Naïve measures               
Inflation over the past 12 months  0.54  0.61  0.75    0.56  0.74  0.95 
Inflation over the past 24 months  0.51  0.65  0.73    0.60  0.78  0.91 
Inflation over the past 36 months  0.57  0.68  0.76    0.63  0.77  0.83 
Survey measures               
6 months ahead  0.50  0.41  0.51    0.58  0.43  0.53 
2 years ahead  0.45  0.47  0.58    0.48  0.42  0.57 
6-10 years ahead  0.47  0.57  0.63    0.46  -  -      
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Table 7 shows that the results are similar when we compare the forecast performance for 
core inflation. All measures of expectations show better forecast performance for core 
inflation, but the improvement for the BEIR in the recent subsample is even more 
pronounced. 
The results for the full sample suggest that survey measures provide the most useful 
information about short- and medium-term inflation expectations. This is actually 
reassuring, in that it shows the BEIR does not simply reflect changes in short-run 
inflation expectations. This study has also shown that the near-term forecast performance 
of the BEIR can change substantially. This possibility may be due to the presence of a 
time-varying inflation-risk premium (and other distortions) in the BEIR, which is a 
disadvantage from the perspective of inflation forecasting.  
9.    Conclusions and Suggestions for Future Research 
We have assessed the merit of the gap between the nominal and real interest rates as a 
measure of long-term inflation expectations. The difference between the BEIR and 
various survey measures of expectations has provided evidence that risk premiums and 
distortions have been important in many periods over the 12-year history of this measure. 
This finding is consistent with international evidence.  
Other evidence suggests that the size and importance of the various premiums have 
changed over time. We directly accounted for the impact of mismatched cash flows on 
the BEIR. We also assessed the importance of term-varying inflation expectations. 
Neither of these factors could account for the differences between the BEIR and survey 
data. We also examined whether changes in proxies for the liquidity and inflation-risk 
premiums are associated with changes in the BEIR. These proxies suggested that the 
premiums did change over the sample, but the timing of the changes did not coincide 
with swings in the BEIR. We have argued, however, that the segmentation of the RRB 
market was an important reason why the BEIR was higher than survey measures from 
1992 to 1997. Many of the premiums were important before 1997, but over the period 
from 2000Q1 to 2003Q4 they were small (or offsetting), on average, and less variable, 
suggesting that the BEIR holds promise as a measure of inflation expectations.      
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Our approach is based on the theory that information from other sources is useful when 
deciding whether a given change in the BEIR is due to inflation expectations or some 
other factor. To the extent that this approach is successful, the BEIR will be a useful 
measure of monetary policy credibility. Our conclusions based on the period to the end of 
2003 are already being tested in 2004, with the BEIR reaching a level of 3.0 per cent, the 
top of Canada’s inflation-target band, while survey measures of long-term inflation 
remain close to 2 per cent. Some of the distortions we have investigated are unlikely to be 
present, but the reason the BEIR reached this level remains an open question (Reid, Dion, 
and Christensen 2004). Bond market participants may be less convinced that inflation 
will stay near  2.0 per cent in the long run, but to get the BEIR even to 2.8 per cent, 
expectations would have to be 3 per cent for more than 15 years. There is little other 
evidence to suggest that this has happened. Alternatively, distortions related to the size of 
the RRB market, or some other factor that we have not investigated, may have  
(re-)emerged. This episode illustrates that using index-linked bonds to extract inflation 
expectations from nominal yields remains a challenge. The potential distortions, the 
possibility that they may change over time, and the difficulty in quantifying them mean 
that the BEIR should not be given a lot of weight as a measure of monetary policy 
credibility at this time. 
With further research in this area and the continuing development of the RRB market, 
some of the distortions will diminish and others may be better quantified. In the future, 
the BEIR could become better suited as a gauge of the credibility of monetary policy. It is 
not, however, as useful as competing tools for short- and medium-term inflation 
forecasting. In addition, week-to-week variation in the BEIR can still be substantial, 
suggesting a focus on more long-term trends of this measure. 
There are a couple of avenues for future research. We have not analyzed the real yield 
calculated from the RRB price on its own. To the extent that it looks and behaves like a 
real ex ante interest rate, there should be less concern about the impact of market 
segmentation on the BEIR. Evidence from the United States suggests that this real yield 
might be a useful measure of the equilibrium real interest rate (Bomfim 2001). If a 
measure of the interest rate gap based on the RRB yield is a good measure of the policy 
stance in Canada, it will provide more evidence that it is capturing the expected long-run      
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real interest rate, rather than reflecting the views of a non-representative subset of 
investors. Such results would lend support to using the RRB yield in the calculation of 
the BEIR. In addition, examining the response of the real and nominal yields to surprise 
macroeconomic and monetary news, as in Gurkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2003), may 
provide evidence that these yields contain the information we think they do.  
This research has put a good deal of faith in surveys of long-run inflation expectations, 
using them as the benchmark for comparison. An avenue for future research would be to 
model explicitly the formation of inflation expectations and compare the model’s 
forecasts with the BEIR and survey measures. A comparison with other financial market-
based measures of inflation expectations, such as nominal yields on government bonds on 
their own, would also be useful.       
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Appendix: Why Is the Inflation-Expectation Term Structure 
      Important?  
Because the BEIR is computed from coupon-paying bonds, the increase in a particular 
forward inflation rate will not impact the BEIR by the same amount as it will affect the 
average inflation over the period ending at the bond maturity.  
Essentially, this is similar to comparing the impact of an increase in a forward rate on the 
ytm of a nominal coupon bond versus the impact on a zero bond ytm with the same 
maturity.   
In equation (A1), we rewrite equation (4) using a forward 1-year inflation rate (f ), where 

















































.        (A1) 
In equation (A2), we derive the RRB price with respect to the 1-year forward inflation 
rate. From this equation, it is clear that the 1-year forward inflation rate will have a 
different impact on the RRB price, depending on the date of the shock: 
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.    (A2) 
Also from equation (A2), we can see that an earlier inflation shock will have a larger 
impact, since it will positively influence all subsequent coupons. Because of the coupon 
structure of the bond, we obtain: 
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Furthermore, the bigger the coupon is, the larger the impact on the BEIR of a non-stable 
inflation rate: 
( ) [ ]
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f .              (A6) 
Therefore, the larger the coupon is, the larger the bias on the measure of average inflation 
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